Causality

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First published Wed Jan 11, 2006; substantive revision Thu Mar 7, 2019

Adverbial elements indicating causality. Malnutrition leads to illness and a reduced ability to work in adulthood, break The warm air rises above the surface of the sea. The University of Pennsylvania (commonly referred to as Penn) is a private university, located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States. A member of the Ivy League, Penn is the fourth-oldest institution of higher education in the United States, and considers itself to be the first university in the United States with both undergraduate and graduate studies.

Causality

Each Aristotelian science consists in the causal investigation of aspecific department of reality. If successful, such an investigationresults in causal knowledge; that is, knowledge of the relevant orappropriate causes. The emphasis on the concept of cause explains whyAristotle developed a theory of causality which is commonly known asthe doctrine of the four causes. For Aristotle, a firm grasp of what acause is, and how many kinds of causes there are, is essential for asuccessful investigation of the world around us.

As will become clear in due course, Aristotle is committed to a formof causal pluralism (Stein 2011: 121–147). ForAristotle, there are four distinct and irreducible kinds of causes.The focus of this entry is on the systematic interrelations amongthese four kinds of causes.

1. Introduction

Aristotle was not the first thinker to engage in a causalinvestigation of the world around us. From the very beginning, andindependently of Aristotle, the investigation of the natural worldconsisted in the search for the relevant causes of a variety ofnatural phenomena. From the Phaedo, for example, we learnthat the so-called “inquiry into nature” consisted in asearch for “the causes of each thing; why each thing comes intoexistence, why it goes out of existence, why it exists” (96 a6–10). In this tradition of investigation, the search for causeswas a search for answers to the question “why?”. Both inthe Physics and in the Metaphysics Aristotle placeshimself in direct continuity with this tradition. At the beginning ofthe Metaphysics, Aristotle offers a concise review of theresults reached by his predecessors (Metaph. I 3–7).From this review we learn that all his predecessors were engaged in aninvestigation that eventuated in knowledge of one or more of thefollowing causes: material, formal, efficient and final cause.However, Aristotle makes it very clear that all his predecessorsmerely touched upon these causes (Metaph. 988 a 22–23;but see also 985 a 10–14 and 993 a 13–15). That is to say,they did not engage in their causal investigation with a firm grasp ofthese four causes. They lacked a complete understanding of the rangeof possible causes and their systematic interrelations. Putdifferently, and more boldly, their use of causality was notsupported by an adequate theory of causality. According toAristotle, this explains why their investigation, even when itresulted in important insights, was not entirely successful.

Causality

This insistence on the doctrine of the four causes as an indispensabletool for a successful investigation of the world around us explainswhy Aristotle provides his reader with a general account of the fourcauses. This account is found, in almost the same words, inPhysics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2.

2. The Four Causes

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle places the followingcrucial condition on proper knowledge: we think we have knowledge of athing only when we have grasped its cause (APost. 71 b9–11. Cf. APost. 94 a 20). That proper knowledge isknowledge of the cause is repeated in the Physics: we thinkwe do not have knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its why,that is to say, its cause (Phys. 194 b 17–20). SinceAristotle obviously conceives of a causal investigation as the searchfor an answer to the question “why?”, and a why-questionis a request for an explanation, it can be useful to think of a causeas a certain type of explanation.

Needless to say, not all why-questions are requests for an explanationthat identifies a cause, let alone a cause in the particular senseenvisioned by Aristotle. Still, Aristotle is clearly committed to theview that giving the relevant cause (or causes) is necessary andsufficient for offering a scientific explanation. His conception of acause has both a metaphysical and an epistemological component. Part of the challenge for us is to do justice to bothcomponents. Following a recent suggestion, we may say that“causes are not ways in which we explain things, exceptderivatively, in virtue of the fact that they are ways in which someelements of the natural world explain others” (Stein 2012a:705).

In Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2, Aristotleoffers his general account of the four causes. This account is generalin the sense that it applies to everything that requires anexplanation, including artistic production and human action. HereAristotle recognizes four kinds of things that can be given in answerto a why-question:

  • The material cause: “that out of which”, e.g., thebronze of a statue.
  • The formal cause: “the form”, “the account ofwhat-it-is-to-be”, e.g., the shape of a statue.
  • The efficient cause: “the primary source of the change orrest”, e.g., the artisan, the art of bronze-casting the statue,the man who gives advice, the father of the child.
  • The final cause: “the end, that for the sake of which athing is done”, e.g., health is the end of walking, losingweight, purging, drugs, and surgical tools.

All the four (kinds of) causes may enter in the explanation ofsomething. Consider the production of an artifact like a bronzestatue. The bronze enters in the explanation of the production of thestatue as the material cause. Note that the bronze is notonly the material out of which the statue is made; it is also thesubject of change, that is, the thing that undergoes the change andresults in a statue. The bronze is melted and poured in order toacquire a new shape, the shape of the statue. This shape enters in theexplanation of the production of the statue as the formalcause. However, an adequate explanation of the production of astatue requires also a reference to the efficient cause orthe principle that produces the statue. For Aristotle, this principleis the art of bronze-casting the statue (Phys. 195 a 6–8. Cf.Metaph. 1013 b 6–9).

This result is mildly surprising and requires a few words ofelaboration. There is no doubt that the art of bronze-casting residesin an individual artisan who is responsible for the production of thestatue. According to Aristotle, however, all the artisan does in theproduction of the statue is the manifestation of specific knowledge.This knowledge, not the artisan who has mastered it, is the salientexplanatory factor that one should pick as the most accuratespecification of the efficient cause (Phys. 195 b21–25). By picking the art, not the artisan, Aristotle is notjust trying to provide an explanation of the production of the statuethat is not dependent upon the desires, beliefs and intentions of theindividual artisan; he is trying to offer an entirely different typeof explanation–namely, an explanation that does not make areference (implicit or explicit) to these desires, beliefs andintentions. More directly, the art of bronze-casting the statue entersin the explanation as the efficient cause because it helps us tounderstand what it takes to produce the statue; that is to say, whatsteps are required to produce the statue. But can an explanation ofthis type be given without a reference to the final outcome of theproduction, the statue? The answer is emphatically “no”. Amodel is made for producing the statue. A mold is prepared forproducing the statue. The bronze is melted and poured for producingthe statue. Both the prior and the subsequent stage are for the sakeof a certain end, the production of the statue. Clearly, the statueenters in the explanation of each step of the artistic production asthe final cause or that for the sake of which everything inthe production process is done.

In thinking about the four causes, we have come to understand thatAristotle offers a teleological explanation of the productionof a bronze statue; that is to say, an explanation that makes areference to the telos or end of the process. Moreover, ateleological explanation of the type sketched above does not cruciallydepend upon the application of psychological concepts such as desires,beliefs and intentions. This is important because artistic productionprovides Aristotle with a teleological model for the study of naturalprocesses, whose explanation does not involve beliefs, desires,intentions or anything of this sort. Some have objected that Aristotleexplains natural process on the basis of an inappropriatelypsychological teleological model; that is to say, a teleological modelthat involves a purposive agent who is somehow sensitive to the end.This objection can be met if the artistic model is understood innon-psychological terms. In other words, Aristotle does notpsychologize nature because his study of the natural world is based ona teleological model that is consciously free from psychologicalfactors. (For further information on the role that artistic productionplays in developing an explanatory model for the study of nature, seeBroadie 1987, pp. 35–50.)

One final clarification is in order. By insisting on the art ofbronze-casting as the most accurate efficient cause of the productionof the statue, Aristotle does not mean to preclude an appeal to thebeliefs and desires of the individual artisan. On the contrary, thereare cases where the individual realization of the art obviously entersin the explanation of the bronze statue. For example, one may beinterested in a particular bronze statue because that statue is thegreat achievement of an artisan who has not only mastered the art buthas also applied it with a distinctive style. In this case it isperfectly appropriate to make reference to the beliefs and desires ofthe artisan. Aristotle seems to make room for this case when he saysthat we should look “for general causes of general things andfor particular causes of particular things” (Phys. 195a 25–26). Note, however, that the idiosyncrasies that may beimportant in studying a particular bronze statue as the greatachievement of an individual artisan may be extraneous to a morecentral (and more interesting) case. To understand why let us focus onthe study of nature. When the student of nature is concerned with theexplanation of a natural phenomenon like the formation of sharp teethin the front and broad molars in the back of the mouth, the student ofnature is concerned with what is typical about thatphenomenon. In other words, the student of nature is expected toprovide an explanation of why certain animals typically havea certain dental arrangement. We shall return to this example in duecourse. For the time being, it is important to emphasize thisimportant feature of the explanatory project attempted by Aristotle; afeature that we must keep in mind in trying to understand his theoryof causality. This theory has in fact been developed primarily (butnot exclusively) for the study of nature.

3. The Four Causes and the Science of Nature

In the Physics, Aristotle builds on his general account ofthe four causes by developing explanatory principles that are specificto the study of nature. Here Aristotle insists that all four causesare involved in the explanation of natural phenomena, and that the jobof “the student of nature is to bring the why-question back tothem all in the way appropriate to the science of nature”(Phys. 198 a 21–23). The best way to understand thismethodological recommendation is the following: the science of natureis concerned with natural bodies insofar as they are subject tochange, and the job of the student of nature is to provide theexplanation of their natural change. The factors that are involved inthe explanation of natural change turn out to be matter, form, thatwhich produces the change, and the end of this change. Note thatAristotle does not say that all four explanatory factors are involvedin the explanation of each and every instance of natural change.Rather, he says that an adequate explanation of natural change mayinvolve a reference to all of them.

Aristotle goes on by adding a specification on his doctrine of thefour causes: the form and the end often coincide, and they areformally the same as that which produces the change (Phys.198 a 23–26). This is one of the several times where Aristotleoffers the slogan “it takes a human being to generate a humanbeing” (for example, Phys. 194 b 13; Metaph.1032 a 25, 1033 b 32, 1049 b 25, 1070 a 8, 1092 a 16). This slogan isdesigned to point at the fundamental fact that the generation of ahuman being can be understood only in the light of the end of theprocess; that is to say, the fully developed human being. The questionthus arises as to what it takes for a human being to be fullydeveloped. Aristotle frames his answer in terms of the human form,maintaining that a human form is fully realized at the end ofgeneration. But this does not explain why it takes a humanbeing to generate a human being. Note, however, that a fullydeveloped human being is not only the end of generation; it is alsowhat initiates the entire process. For Aristotle, the ultimate movingprinciple responsible for the generation of a human being is a fullydeveloped living creature of the same kind; that is, a human being whois formally the same as the end of generation. (A final clarificationis in order here: Aristotle is committed to a hylomorphic explanationof animal generation. His considered view is that the father suppliesthe form whereas the mother provides the matter.)

Thus, the student of nature is often left with three types of causes:the formal/final cause, the efficient cause, and the material cause.However, the view that there are in nature causes besides material andefficient causes was controversial in antiquity. According toAristotle, most of his predecessors recognized only the material andthe efficient cause. This explains why Aristotle cannot be contentwith saying that formal and final causes often coincide, but he alsohas to defend his thesis against an opponent who denies that finalcausality is a genuine mode of causality.

4. Final Causes Defended

Physics II 8 contains Aristotle’s most general defenseof final causality. Here Aristotle establishes that explaining naturerequires final causality by discussing a difficulty that may beadvanced by an opponent who denies that there are final causes innature. Aristotle shows that an opponent who claims that material andefficient causes alone suffice to explain natural change fails toaccount for their characteristic regularity. Before considering howthe defense is attempted, however, it is important to clarify thatthis defense does not perform the function of a proof. By showing thatan approach to the study of nature that ignores final causality cannotaccount for a crucial aspect of nature, Aristotle does not therebyprove that there are final causes in nature. Strictly speaking, theonly way to prove that nature exhibits final causality is to establishit on independent grounds. But this is not what Aristotle does inPhysics II 8. Final causality is here introduced as the bestexplanation for an aspect of nature which otherwise would remainunexplained.

Causality

The difficulty that Aristotle discusses is introduced by consideringthe way in which rain works. It rains because of material processeswhich can be specified as follows: when the warm air that has beendrawn up is cooled off and becomes water, then this water comes downas rain (Phys. 198 b 19–21). It may happen that thecorn in the field is nourished or the harvest is spoiled as a resultof the rain, but it does not rain for the sake of any good or badresult. The good or bad result is just a coincidence (Phys.198 b 21–23). So, why cannot all natural change work in the sameway? For example, why cannot it be merely a coincidence that the frontteeth grow sharp and suitable for tearing the food and the molars growbroad and useful for grinding the food (Phys. 198 b23–27)? When the teeth grow in just this way, then the animalsurvives. When they do not, then the animal dies. More directly, andmore explicitly, the way the teeth grow is not for the sake of theanimal, and its survival or its death is just a coincidence(Phys. 198 b 29–32).

Aristotle’s reply is that the opponent is expected to explainwhy the teeth regularly grow in the way they do: sharp teethin the front and broad molars in the back of the mouth. Moreover,since this dental arrangement is suitable for biting and chewing thefood that the animal takes in, the opponent is expected to explain theregular connection between the needs of the animal and theformation of its teeth. Either there is a real causal connectionbetween the formation of the teeth and the needs of the animal, orthere is no real causal connection and it just so happens that the waythe teeth grow is good for the animal. In this second case it is justa coincidence that the teeth grow in a way that it is good for theanimal. But this does not explain the regularity of theconnection. Where there is regularity there is also a call for anexplanation, and coincidence is no explanation at all. In other words,to say that the teeth grow as they do by material necessity and thisis good for the animal by coincidence is to leave unexplained theregular connection between the growth of the teeth and the needs ofthe animal. Aristotle offers final causality as his explanation forthis regular connection: the teeth grow in the way they do for bitingand chewing food and this is good for the animal. (See Code 1997:127–134.)

One thing to be appreciated about Aristotle’s reply is that thefinal cause enters in the explanation of the formation of the parts ofan organism like an animal as something that is good eitherfor the existence or the flourishing of the animal. In the first case,something is good for the animal because the animal cannot survivewithout it; in the second case, something is good for the animalbecause the animal is better off with it. This helps us to understandwhy in introducing the concept of end (telos) that isrelevant to the study of natural processes Aristotle insists on itsgoodness: “not everything that is last claims to be an end(telos), but only that which is best” (Phys.194 a 32–33).

Once his defense of the use of final causes is firmly in place,Aristotle can make a step further by focusing on the role that matterplays in his explanatory project. Let us return to the example chosenby Aristotle, the regular growth of sharp teeth in the front and broadmolars in the back of the mouth. What explanatory role is left for thematerial processes involved in the natural process? Aristotle does notseem to be able to specify what material processes are involved in thegrowth of the teeth, but he is willing to recognize that certainmaterial processes have to take place for the teeth to grow in theparticular way they do. In other words, there is more to the formationof the teeth than these material processes, but this formation doesnot occur unless the relevant material processes take place. ForAristotle, these material processes are that which is necessary to therealization of a specific goal; that which is necessary on thehypothesis that the end is to be obtained.

Hypothetical necessity is often equated to conditional necessity. Butthis equation can be a first approximation at best. Stating theconditions under which something is the case is not yet giving asuccessful explanation. In other words, conditional necessity is awider, and indeed weaker, notion than hypothetical necessity (seeStein 2016: 353–382, for a lucid reflection on this point).

Physics II 9 is entirely devoted to the introduction of theconcept of hypothetical necessity and its relevance for theexplanatory ambition of Aristotle’s science of nature. In thischapter, matter is reconfigured as hypothetical necessity. By so doingAristotle acknowledges the explanatory relevance of the materialprocesses, while at the same time he emphasizes their dependency upona specific end.

5. The Explanatory Priority of Final Causes

In the Physics, Aristotle builds on his general account ofthe four causes in order to provide the student of nature with theexplanatory resources indispensable for a successful investigation ofthe natural world. However, the Physics does not provideall the explanatory resources for all naturalinvestigations. Aristotle returns to the topic of causality in thefirst book of the Parts of Animals. This is a relativelyindependent and self-contained treatise entirely devoted to developingthe explanatory resources required for a successful study of animalsand animal life. Here Aristotle completes his theory of causality byarguing for the explanatory priority of the final cause over theefficient cause.

Significantly enough, there is no attempt to argue for the existenceof four fundamental modes of causality in the first book of theParts of Animals. Evidently, Aristotle expects his reader tobe already familiar with his general account of the four causes aswell as his defense of final causality. The problem that here concernsAristotle is presented in the following way: since both the final andthe efficient cause are involved in the explanation of naturalgeneration, we have to establish what is first and what is second(PA 639 b 12–13). Aristotle argues that there is noother way to explain natural generation than by reference to what liesat the end of the process. This has explanatory priority over theprinciple that is responsible for initiating the process ofgeneration. Aristotle relies on the analogy between artisticproduction and natural generation, and the teleological model that hehas developed for the explanation of artistic production. Consider,for example, house-building. There is no other way to explain how ahouse is built, or is being built, than by reference to the finalresult of the process, the house. More directly, the bricks and thebeams are put together in the particular way they are for the sake ofachieving a certain end: the production of the house. This is truealso in the case of natural generation. In this contextAristotle’ slogan is “generation is for the sake ofsubstance, not substance for the sake of generation”(PA 640 a 18–19). This means that the proper way toexplain the generation of an organism like an animal, or the formationof its parts, is by reference to the product that lies at the end ofthe process; that is to say, a substance of a certain type.

From Aristotle we learn that Empedocles explained the articulation ofthe human spine into vertebrae as the result of the twisting andturning that takes place when the fetus is in the womb of the mother.Aristotle finds this explanation unacceptable (PA 640 a19–26). To begin with, the fetus must have the power to twistand turn in the way it does, and Empedocles does not have anexplanation for this fact. Secondly, and more importantly, Empedoclesoverlooks the fact that it takes a human being to generate ahuman being. That is to say, the originating principle of thegeneration is a fully developed human being which is formally the sameas the final outcome of the process of generation. It is only bylooking at the fully developed human being that we can understand whyour spine is articulated into vertebrae and why the vertebrae arearranged in the particular way they are. This amounts to finding therole that the spine has in the life of a fully developed human being.Moreover, it is only by looking at the fully developed human beingthat we can explain why the formation of the vertebrae takes place inthe particular way it does. (For further information about theexplanatory priority of the final over the efficient cause, see Code1997: 127–143.)

Perhaps we are now in the position to understand how Aristotle arguesthat there are four kinds of causes and at the same time says thatproper knowledge is knowledge of the cause or knowledge ofthe why (APost. 71 b 10–12, 94 a 20;Phys. 194 b 17–20; Metaph. 981 a 28–30).Admittedly, at least at first sight, this is a bit confusing.Confusion dissolves when we realize that Aristotle recognizes theexplanatory primacy of the final/formal cause over the efficient andmaterial cause. Of course this does not mean that the other causes canbe eliminated. Quite the contrary: Aristotle is adamant that, for afull range of cases, all four causes must be given in order to give anexplanation. More explicitly, for a full range of cases, anexplanation which fails to invoke all four causes is no explanation atall. At the same time, however, the final/formal cause is the primarycause and knowledge of this cause amounts to knowledge of the why.

6. The Explanation of a Lunar Eclipse

We have already seen that Aristotle is not committed to the view thateverything has all four kinds of causes, Rather, his view is that ascientific explanation requires up to four kinds of causes. We mayillustrate this point with the help of an example. Consider, inparticular, the case of a lunar eclipse. In the Metaphysics,Aristotle says that an eclipse of the moon does not have a final cause(Metaph. 1044 b 12). He also says that, strictly speaking, alunar eclipse does not have matter. Rather, it has a cause that playsa role analogous to matter. This second claim can be inferredfrom what Aristotle says about the things that exist by nature but arenot substances. With respect to these things, Aristotle says that theydo not have matter but rather something that underlies(Metaph. 1044 b 8–9). In the case of a lunar eclipse,that which underlies is the subject affected by the eclipse, that is,the moon. The moon is not strictly speaking the matter of the eclipsebut rather the subject that undergoes an eclipse when the earth comesin the middle between the moon and the sun. Should we give the earthas the efficient cause of a lunar eclipse? We have to be careful here.By saying that the moon is a deprivation of light caused by the earth,we distinguish this particular deprivation of light from other kindsof deprivation of light. Still, by citing the earth as the efficientcause of a lunar eclipse, we are not yet giving the most precisedescription of the efficient cause. More directly, we are not yetsaying what the earth is doing to cause a lunar eclipse. A lunareclipse is a deprivation of light caused by the interposition of theearth between the sun and the moon. By coming in the middle of themoon and the sun the earth blocks the light and causes the moon tosuffer an eclipse. Hence, it is the interposition of the earth betweenthe sun and the moon is the proximate efficient cause of alunar eclipse. Citing the proximate efficient cause is also giving themost accurate description, and indeed the full explanation, of a lunareclipse. (An insightful discussion of how Aristotle explains naturalphenomena such as a lunar eclipse and sleep can be found in Code 2015:11–45).

This brief discussion of the explanation of eclipse of the moon bringsus back to a point that was already made in connection withAristotle’s explanation of the production of an artifact such as abronze statue. There too we are required to look for the most accuratedescription of the efficient cause, which is to be identified with theart of bronze-casting a statue rather than the artisan. It is possibleto build on both examples to conclude that Aristotle is concerned notonly with finding the relevant kinds of causes but also with givingthe most accurate description of those causes. By his lights, it isonly the most accurate description of all the relevant causes thatgives us the full explanation, and thereby scientific knowledge, ofsomething.

7. Conclusion

The study of nature was a search for answers to the question“why?” before and independently of Aristotle. A criticalexamination of the use of the language of causality by hispredecessors, together with a careful study of natural phenomena, ledAristotle to elaborate a theory of causality. This theory ispresented in its most general form in Physics II 3 and inMetaphysics V 2. In both texts, Aristotle argues that afinal, formal, efficient or material cause can be given in answer to awhy-question.

Aristotle further elaborates on causality in the rest ofPhysics II and in Parts of Animals I. Aristotleexplores the systematic interrelations among the four modes ofcausality and argues for the explanatory priority of the final cause.In so doing Aristotle not only expands on his theory of causality; healso builds explanatory principles that are specific to the study ofnature. Aristotle considers these principles an indispensabletheoretical framework for a successful investigation of the naturalworld. Both Physics II and Parts of Animals have afoundational character. More directly, Aristotle expects the studentof nature to have mastered these principles before engaging in theinvestigation of any aspect of the natural world.

Although Aristotle’s theory of causality is developed in thecontext of his science of nature, its application goes well beyond theboundaries of natural science. This is already clear from the mostgeneral presentation of the theory in Physics II 3 and inMetaphysics V 2. Here the four causes are used to explainhuman action as well as artistic production. In addition, anytheoretical investigation that there might be besides natural sciencewill employ the doctrine of the four causes.

Consider, briefly, the case of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.Here Aristotle is seeking wisdom. Part of the argument of theMetaphysics is in an attempt to clarify what sort of wisdomAristotle is seeking. Suffice it to say that Aristotle conceives ofthis wisdom as a science of substance that is, or is a part of, ascience of being qua being (for further information about thisargument, see the entry Aristotle’s Metaphysics, especiallySections 1 and 3.) What is important is that this science consists ina causal investigation, that is, a search for the relevant causes.This helps us to understand why the most general presentation ofAristotle’s theory of causality is repeated, in almost the samewords, in Physics II 3 and in Metaphysics V 2.Although the Physics and the Metaphysics belong totwo different theoretical enterprises, in both cases we are expectedto embark on an investigation that will eventuate in causal knowledge,and this is not possible without a firm grasp of the interrelationsbetween the four (types of) causes.

8. Glossary of Aristotelian Terminology

  • account: logos
  • art: technê
  • artisan: technitês
  • cause: aitia, aition
  • difficulty: aporia
  • end: telos
  • essence: to ti ên einai
  • form: eidos
  • generation: genesis
  • goal: telos
  • knowledge: epistêmê
  • hypothesis: hypothesis
  • necessity: anankê
  • principle: archê
  • substance:ousia
  • why: dia ti, dioti
  • wisdom: sophia

Bibliography

General survey

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The Four Causes

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Art and Nature

Causality Vs Correlation

Causality
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  • Jacobs, W., 1978, “Art and Biology in Aristotle,” inG. C. Simmons (ed.), Paideia (Special Aristotle Issue),Brockport/Buffalo: State University College, 16–29.
  • Solmsen, F., 1963, “Nature as Craftsman in GreekThought,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 24:473–496; reprinted in F. Solmsen, Kleine Schriften,Hildesheim: Olms, 332–351.

Teleology and Necessity

  • Balme, D., 1987, “Teleology and Necessity,” in A.Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues inAristotle Biology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,275–286.
  • Bolton, R., 1997, “The Material Cause: Matter andExplanation in Aristotle’s Natural Science,” in W.Kullmann and S. Föllinger (eds.), AristotelischeBiologie, Stuttgart: Steiner, 97–126.
  • Boylan, M., 1981, “Mechanism and Teleology inAristotle’s Biology,” Apeiron, 15:96–102.
  • –––, 1984, “The Place of Nature inAristotle’s Teleology,” Apeiron, 18:126–140.
  • Bradie, M., Miller, 1984, F. D., “Teleology and NaturalNecessity in Aristotle,” History of PhilosophyQuarterly, 1: 133–146.
  • Byrne, C., 2002, “Aristotle on Physical Necessity and theLimits of Teleological Explanation,” Apeiron, 35:20–46.
  • Cameron, R., 2002, “The Ontology of Aristotle’s FinalCause,” Apeiron, 35: 153–179.
  • Charles, D., 1988, “Aristotle on Hypothetical Necessity andIrreducibility,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 69:1–53; reprinted in T. Irwin (ed.), Classical Philosophy.Collected Papers, New York/London: Routledge, 27–80.
  • –––, 1991, “Teleological Causation in thePhysics,” in L. Judson (ed.), Aristotle’sPhysics: A Collection of Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press,101–128.
  • –––, 2012, “Teleological Causation,”in C. Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 227–266.
  • Cooper, J. M., 1982, “Aristotle on Natural Teleology,”in M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (eds.), Language and Logos,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197–222; reprinted in J.M. Cooper, Knowledge, Nature and the Good: Essays on AncientPhilosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004,107–129.
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  • –––, 1987, “Hypothetical Necessity andNatural Teleology,” in A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox (eds.),Philosophical Issues in Aristotle Biology, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 243–274.
  • Friedman, R., 1983, “Matter and Necessity inPhysics B 9, 200 a 15–30,” AncientPhilosophy, 1: 8–12.
  • Furley, D. J., 1999, “What Kind of Cause is Aristotle’Final Cause?,” in M. Frede and G. Stricker (eds.),Rationality in Greek Thought, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 59–79.
  • Gotthelf, A., 1976/1977,“Aristotle Conception of FinalCausality,” Review of Metaphysics, 30: 226–254;reprinted with additional notes and a Postscript in A. Gotthelf and J.G. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’sBiology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987,204–242. The original paper with the 1986 Postscript isreprinted in A. Gotthelf, Teleology, First Principles, andScientific Method in Aristotle’s Biology, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press 2012, 1–44
  • –––, 1988, “The Place of the Good inAristotle’s Teleology,” in J. J. Cleary and D. C. Shartin(eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium in AncientPhilosophy, 4: 113–39; reprinted in A. Gotthelf,Teleology, First Principles, and Scientific Method inAristotle’s Biology, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012,45–66
  • –––, 1997, “UnderstandingAristotle’s Teleology,” in R. Hassing (ed.), FinalCausality in Nature and Human Affairs, Washington D.C.: CatholicUniversity Press, 71–82. A revised, updated, and expandedversion of this article is reprinted in A. Gotthelf, Teleology,First Principles, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’sBiology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 67–89.
  • –––, 2012, “Teleology and Embryogenesis inAristotle’s Generation of Animals II 6,” in A.Gotthelf, Teleology, First Principles, and Scientific Method inAristotle’s Biology, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012,90–116.
  • Henry, D., 2013, “Optimality and Teleology inAristotle’s Natural Science,” in Oxford Studies inAncient Philosophy, 37: 225–261.
  • Johnson, M. R., 2005, Aristotle on Teleology, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
  • Judson, L., 2005, “Aristotelian Teleology,”,Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 29: 341–365.
  • Leunissen, M., 2010, Explanation and Teleology inAristotle’s Science of Nature, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
  • –––, 2010, “Nature as a Good Houskeeper.Secondary Teleology and Material Necessity in Aristotle’sBiology,” in Apeiron, 43: 117–142.
  • Leunissen, M., and A. Gotthelf, 2010, “What’sTeleology Got to Do with It? A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’sGeneration of Animals,” Phronesis, 55:325–356; reprinted in A. Gotthelf, Teleology, FirstPrinciples, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Biology,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 117–141.
  • Lewis, F., 1988, “Teleology and Material/Efficient Causes inAristotle,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 69:54–98.
  • Nussbaum, M., 1978, “Aristotle on TeleologicalExplanation,” in M. Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De motuanimalium, Princeton: Princeton University Press,59–99.
  • Owens, J., 1968, “The Teleology of Nature,”Monist, 52: 159–173; reprinted J. R. Catan (ed.),Aristotle: The Collected Papers of J. Owens, Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press, 1981, 136–147.
  • Pellegrin, P., 2002, “Les ruses de la nature etl’eternité du mouvement. Encore quelques remarques sur lafinalité chez Aristote,” in M. Canto-Sperber and P.Pellegrin (eds.), Le Style de la pensée. Recueil des textesen hommage à Jacques Brunschwig, Paris: Les BellesLettres, 296–323.
  • Quarantotto, D., 2005, Causa finale, sostanza, essenza inAristotele, Saggi sulla struttura dei processi teleologici naturali esulla funzione dei telos, Napoli: Bibliopolis.
  • Sauvé Meyer, S., 1992, “Aristotle, Teleology, andReduction,” Philosophical Review, 101, 791–825;reprinted in T. Irwin (ed.), Classical Philosophy. CollectedPapers, New York/London: Routledge, 1995, 81–116.
  • Scharle, M., 2008, “Elemental Teleology in Aristotle’sPhysics II 8,” Oxford Studies in AncientPhilosophy, 34: 147–184.
  • –––, 2008, “The Role of Material andEfficient Causes in Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy,” inApeiron, 41 (Special Issue: Aristotle on Life, J.Mouracade, ed.): 27–46.
  • Sorabji, R., 1980, Necessity, Cause and Blame, Ithaca:Cornell University Press.
  • Wieland, W., 1975, “The Problem of Teleology,” in J.Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (eds.), Articles onAristotle, London: Duckworth, pp. 141–160; originallypublished as chapter 16, “Zum Teleologieproblem,” ofDie aristotelische Physik, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck undRuprecht, 1962.

Special Topics

  • Bodnár, I., 2005, “Teleology across Natures,”Rhizai, 2: 9–29.
  • Boeri, M. D., 1995, “Change and Teleology in AristotlePhysics,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 34:87–96.
  • Code, A., 2015, “The Matter of Sleep,” in D. Ebrey, Theory and PRactice in Aristotle’s Natural Science,Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press, 11–45.
  • Fine, G., 1987, “Forms as Causes: Plato andAristotle,” in A. Graeser (ed.), Mathematics and Metaphysicsin Aristotle, Bern: Haupt, 69–112.
  • Furley, D. J., 1985,“The Rainfall Example inPhysics II 8,” in A. Gotthelf (ed.), Aristotle onNature and Living Things, Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications,177–182; reprinted in D. J. Furley, Cosmic Problems,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 115–120.
  • –––, 2004, “Aristotle and the Atomists onForms and Final Causes,” in R. W. Sharples, Perspectives onGreek Philosophy, Aldershot: Ashgate, 70–84.
  • Gaiser, K., 1969, “Das zweifache Telos beiAristoteles”, in I. Düring (ed.), Naturphilosophie beiAristoteles und Theophrast (4th SimposiumAristotelicum), Heidelberg: Stiehm, 97–113.
  • Gotthelf, A., 1989, “Teleology and Spontaneous Generation: ADiscussion,” Apeiron (Special Issue, Nature,Knowledge and Virtue, R. Kraut and T. Penner, eds.), 22 (4):181–193; reprinted in A. Gotthelf, Teleology, FirstPrinciples, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Biology,Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012, 142–150.
  • Kullmann, W., 1985, “Different Concepts of the Final Causein Aristotle,” in A. Gotthelf (ed.), Aristotle on Nature andLiving Things, Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications,170–175.
  • Lennox, J. G., 1984, “Aristotle on Chance,” Archivfür Geschichte der Philosophie, 66: 52–60; reprintedin J. G. Lennox, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 250–258.
  • –––, 1982, “Teleology, Chance, andAristotle’s Theory of Spontaneous Generation,” TheJournal of History of Philosophy, 20: 219–238; reprinted inJ. G. Lennox, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 229–249.
  • –––, 1999, “Material and Formal Natures inAristotle’s De Partibus Animalium,” in J. G.Lennox, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999, 182–204.
  • Pavlopoulos, M., 2003, “Aristotle’s Natural Teleologyand Metaphysics of Life”, Oxford Studies in AncientPhilosophy, 24: 133–181.
  • Sedley, D., 1991, “Is Aristotle’s TeleologyAnthropocentric?” Phronesis, 36: 179–197.
  • –––, 2010, “Teleology, Aristotle andPlato,” in R. Bolton and J. G. Lennox (eds.), Being, Nature,and Life. Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 5–29.
  • Turnbull, R. G., 1958, “Aristotle’s Debt to the‘Natural Philosophy’ of the Phaedo,”Philosophical Quarterly, 8: 131–143.
  • Wardy, R., 1993,“Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore ofAverages,” Phronesis, 38, 18–30.

Causality Manipulation

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Christopher Shields, Greg Salmieri, IstvánBodnár, and Mark Goodwin for commenting on drafts of thisentry.

Copyright © 2019 by
Andrea Falcon<Andrea.Falcon@concordia.ca>